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Introduction
In Southeast Asia, the birth of postcolonial states in the aftermath of the Sec-
ond World War marked a watershed in political relations between ethnic 
groups residing within emerging geo-political borders.1 Plurality and dif-
ference were defining characteristics of the social landscape in these nascent 
states. Colonial laws and policies that divided groups and territories for ef-
ficient control influenced the relations between linguistically and culturally 
distinct groups. The transfer of power to ‘natives’ during decolonization often 
resulted in indigenous minorities being sidelined politically and legally. In-
digenous minorities in Southeast Asia continue to negotiate for more equi-
table inclusion in contemporary postcolonial states. In some cases, such as in 
Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, these have escalated into 
separatist movements. Other indigenous minorities however, struggle for the 
recognition of their identity and rights through – rather than apart from – 
existing state mechanisms of power, for example by lobbying for changes in 
existing laws and bringing cases to court. 
The struggle for recognition of the legal rights of indigenous minorities 
began, however, before the process of decolonization; colonial powers con-
tended with politically dominant indigenous majorities as they tried to exert 
influence over territories, and this had impacts on indigenous minorities. The 
British method of colonization, in particular, which sought to attain ‘indi-
rect rule’ without using military conquest, required the identification and 
recognitio n of native structures of power. British administrators exerted influ-
ence through the ‘invitation’ of local rulers, which meant that domestic laws 
1 This paper is based on a chapter submitted for a master’s thesis to the National University of 
Singapore in 2004. I am grateful for the comments of two anonymous reviewers and Martin D. 
Jones, which were incorporated when revising this manuscript.
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and administrative policies were developed as a result of negotiation rather 
than through direct imposition of English laws and policies. As a result, the 
legal structures put in place during decolonization meant that some recogni-
tion of indigenous customary practices was already incorporated, albeit for 
certain indigenous groups and not for others. 
In order to recognize and protect the ‘special rights’ of indigenous per-
sons, it became vital to define the legal identity of individuals. It was neces-
sary for British administrators to determine which groups were ‘indigenous’, 
what specific criteria were required for demonstrating membership of these 
groups, and when disputes occurred, to determine which individuals pos-
sessed a legitimate claim of belonging. They also had to decide if the rights 
and privileges were accorded on a group or individual basis. These decisions 
are neither ahistorical nor apolitical.
In this paper, I examine the contemporary case of the Orang Asli, the 
minority indigenous peoples of the Malay Peninsula. I begin by providing 
an outline of political developments that have resulted in the legal recogni-
tion of three groups of people as having indigenous status. I also review the 
evolution of the Malaysian legal system in order to provide a context for 
subsequent discussion. I then look at how Orang Asli are recognized in the 
Federal Constitution and in statutes, with reference to case law, as the mean-
ing and weight of these written laws were elaborated in court judgements. I 
then look at three court cases, reviewing the right to engage in commercial 
activities in aboriginal places as decided in the Koperasi Kijang Mas Bhd 
& Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Perak & Ors (1991), hereafter referred to as the 
Koperasi Kijang Mas case; the recognition of native title and usufructuary 
rights as recognized in Adong Kuwau & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor 
(1997), hereafter referred to as the Adong Kuwau case, a judgement upheld in 
the Court of Appeal (Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor v. Adong Kuwau & Ors 
(1998) and the Federal Court;2 as well as proprietary rights in and to the land 
which were recognized in the Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor 
& Ors (2002) ruling, hereafter referred to as the Sagong Tasi case, upheld in 
the Court of Appeal (see Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors v. Sagong Bin Tasi 
& Ors (2005) but currently under appeal in the Federal Court. These cases 
demonstrate how Orang Asli have drawn on international legal frameworks 
to claim special privileges in ways not possible for other Malaysians, on the 
basis of their identity.
2 This judgement was not written.
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Indigenous identity in postcolonial Malaysia
Modern conceptions of identity in present-day Malaysia are rooted in Brit-
ish colonial conceptions of ‘natives’ prior to the Independence of Malaya in 
1957 (Nah 2003, 2004; Hirschman 1986, 1987). Social understandings of who 
were ‘indigenous’ and ‘immigrant’ have implicated not only the way in which 
power operated under colonial administration but how sovereignty was ne-
gotiated and legal systems reconstructed during the transition from colonial 
to postcolonial rule. The exertion of British power and control over the Penin-
sula in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries occurred through negotiations 
with existing Malay-Muslim polities. These agreements allowed the British to 
control economic resources on the condition that the sovereignty of ‘Malay’ 
rulers was acknowledged and that they retained authority in matters concern-
ing ‘Malay’ customs and religion (Harper 1999). 
The recognition of the Malay rulers as legitimate authorities for political 
negotiations shaped the body-politic of the Federation of Malaya in 1948, 
Independent Malaya in 1957, and the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. Most 
notably, Malays were given constitutional guarantees of ‘special privileges’ on 
the basis of their indigeneity; Islam, the religion of the Malays, was declared 
the religion of the Federation; and the Malay language was given primacy, 
becoming the national ‘emblems of nation-ness’ (Anderson 1991:133). In an 
effort to protect the customary lands of the Malays from being sold, British 
lawmakers instituted the Malay Reservations Act of 1930, based on the Malay 
Reservations Enactment of 1913, a unique statutory provision that restricted 
the transfer of land titles (see discussions by Means 1971 and Voon 1976). 
In contemporary Malaysia, three groups are socially, politically and legal-
ly recognized as being ‘indigenous’ to the land, and all of them are consid-
ered ‘bumiputra’ (literally translated ‘sons of the soil’): the politically pow-
erful majority ‘Malays’ (all of whom, by constitutional legal definition are 
Muslims), the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, and the Orang Asli.3 Orang Asli 
is a ‘pan-ethnic identity’ (Cornell 2000) that refers to a number of linguisti-
cally and culturally distinct groups. In 2003, there were an estimated 147,412 
Orang Asli divided into 18 ethnic sub-groups,4 comprising about 0.5% of the 
3 There are still debates about whether or not the Orang Asli are bumiputra. I argue in Nah 
(2004) that a distinction must be made between ‘bumiputra status’ – which the Orang Asli are 
accorded in government policies (despite the fact they are not given special privileges in Article 
153 of the Federal Constitution, the way the Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak are) – and 
the ‘enjoyment of bumiputra benefits’, such as discounts on housing schemes, special quotas for 
university admission, and scholarships for further education, which are reserved for bumiputra 
groups on the basis of their ‘special position’. The Orang Asli as a whole do not have the same 
level of access to bumiputra benefits as their Malay counterparts in the Peninsula. 
4 Statistics obtained from the website of the Centre for Orang Asli Concerns, accessed 14-2-2008, 
(http://www.coac.org.my/). Debates ensue about the actual number of Orang Asli sub-ethnic 
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total population of Malaysia. Prior to the introduction of the term ‘Orang Asli’ 
in the 1960s (Carey 1976), they were referred to by the British as the ‘aborigi-
nes’, a term which is still applied in the current legal system.5 
The evolution of the Malaysian legal system
The present structures of the Malaysian legal system are the culmination of 
changes, amendments and developments since British colonial administrators 
introduced principles of English law in the 1800s. Under colonial administra-
tion, the religions, manners, and customs of local inhabitants were considered 
in the development of laws; legal recognition was given to selected custom-
ary practices (Hooker 1976). The colonial government recognized the plural-
ity of the peoples under its jurisdiction, and allowed, indeed required, their 
identities to be established before the relevance and role of ‘customs’ could be 
evaluated. As Hooker explains, several types of identities became relevant to 
the legal system: those constructed on ‘racial’ grounds (such as ‘Chinese’ or 
‘Malay’), religious grounds (for example ‘Muslim’), or a combination of both 
(for example, a ‘Hindu’). 
Selective recognition of the customary practices of distinct groups contin-
ues in the current postcolonial legal system; the principle of lawful discrimi-
nation is applicable for certain legally defined categories of people.6 For the 
Orang Asli, I suggest that three types of identity definitions have implications 
for their legal position: their ethnic/racial difference, their religious ascription, 
and, because of recent court cases, their status as minority indigenous people 
according to international legal definitions. 
Officially, a strict hierarchical ordering of texts exists in the Malaysian legal 
system, with the Federal Constitution – specifically, the Malay version – seen 
as the supreme authority (Federal Constitution, Article 160B). It is to this that 
all political and legal developments, in principle if not always in practice, are 
required to adhere. This has important implications for the interpretation of 
statutes and for judicial decisions; all statutes written prior to the independence 
of Malaya in 1957, as well as after, have to be interpreted – and modified if 
necessary – to bring them in line with the Constitution; any inconsistencies are 
groups. Lye (2001) suggests that between 17 to 25 indigenous ethnic minorities may be consid-
ered Orang Asli. Benjamin (2002) notes that some smaller groups are subsumed under other 
ethnic categories.
5 The subject of Orang Asli in the law has also been discussed by, among others, Bunnell and 
Nah 2004; Boon Kheng Cheah 2002; Nicholas 2000; Hooker 1996, 2001; Hood 1990; Liow 1981; 
Means 1986; Nair 2001; Rachagan 1990; Sullivan 1998; and Williams-Hunt 1995. 
6 For further discussion, see Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v. Public Prosecutor (1977), which 
establishes the principle that ‘lawful discrimination’ is permitted under clause (5) of Article 8 and 
Article 153 of the Constitution. 
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made void.7 The Constitution sets out the roles of federal and state govern-
ments, divides powers of the executive, legislative and judiciary,8 and out-
lines the fundamental freedoms of the peoples of the Malaysian nation-state. 
Because of the separation of powers, space is constructed for judicial courts to 
arbitrate between citizens, organizations, and members of the executive.9 
Nevertheless, there are limits on the supremacy of the Constitution. 
Firstly, there are provisions that allow for it to be amended. This is accom-
plished through a two-thirds majority vote in Parliament and the assent of the 
constitutional monarch (the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong). Indeed, since its initial 
form in 1957, numerous changes have been made (Hoong Phun Lee 1995). 
Secondly, the Constitution is a text requiring application and interpretation. 
Judges therefore play a significant role, particularly when these interpreta-
tions are contested in the courts.10 
Laws are legislated by Parliament at the federal level, and by state legisla-
tive assemblies at the state level. The former have the power to enact laws on 
issues identified in List I of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution, 
while the latter can enact laws as listed in List II of the Ninth Schedule, which 
pertain mostly to Islam, land, agriculture, forestry and local government. 
At the federal level, bills have to be passed by the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, and given assent by the constitutional monarch. 
The precise definition and meaning of rights are established through court 
cases, which require direct application of written laws. The Malaysian legal 
system operates on the principle of stare decisis, that is, the hierarchical system 
of binding judicial precedent.11 In Malaysian law, as in English common law, 
the decisions of higher courts are binding upon lower courts, such that the 
Federal Court is the ultimate authority, followed by the Court of Appeal, and 
the High Courts of Peninsular Malaysia and of Sabah and Sarawak.12 Specific 
contests over land are judged by the High Court in the first instance, and 
7 Federal Constitution, Article 4(1); Article 162(6). This was affirmed in relation to the Aborigi-
nal Peoples Act of 1954 in the Sagong Tasi Court of Appeal judgement discussed below.
8 This allows for the judiciary to decide upon cases where the executive – for example, the 
federal government and all state governments – are plaintiffs, appellants or defendants. 
9 However, the independence of the judiciary has come under severe criticism from the 1980s 
up to the present (see Harding 1990; Case 1991).
10 Tun Mohamed Suffian 1976. As Gopal Sri Ram JCA eloquently articulated, in Repco Holdings 
Berhad v. Public Prosecutor ([1997] 3 MLJ 681), ‘Our Federal Constitution is a living document 
written for all time. Its language compresses within it ideas that are manifold and concepts that 
are multifaceted. The task of the judicial interpreter of such a document is not to place it in a coffin 
and nail the lid but to breathe life into it and to give effect to the full breadth and width of its great 
language.’
11 See Public Prosecutor v. Datuk Tan Cheng Swee & Anor ([1980] 1 LNS 58).
12 These are followed by the Subordinate Courts, which, in the case of Peninsular Malaysia, are 
the Sessions Courts, Magistrates’ Courts, Small Claims Courts, and Penghulu Courts. In addition, 
Syariah courts are subordinate to the Superior Courts (Mei Pheng Lee 2001).
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may be brought for appeal to the Court of Appeal and thence to the Federal 
Court. At the High Court, these cases are decided on a balance of probabilities 
by a judge acting as trier of fact. In Sabah and Sarawak, Native Courts have 
jurisdiction over matters concerning ‘native customs’, where the parties are 
natives; there is no parallel system in Peninsular Malaysia. Across the whole 
of Malaysia, however, there are Syariah courts, which have jurisdiction over 
Islamic law.
Orang Asli in the Federal Constitution
In the current version of the Constitution, the ‘aborigine’ (in the Malay text, 
orang asli) is recognized as a separate legal entity from the ‘Malay’ (Orang 
Melayu) and the ‘natives’ (bumiputra) of Sabah and Sarawak (see Figure 1). 
As such, ‘aborigines’ may not claim legal rights given to ‘Malays’ and vice 
versa.13 The ‘aborigine’ is defined in Article 160(2) of the Constitution as ‘an 
aborigine of the Malay Peninsula’, highlighting its minority location within a 
geographically imagined ‘Malay’ broader territory. There are two important 
implications of this brief and tautological definition. Firstly, it places greater 
emphasis on the Aboriginal People’s Act (Act 134) definition of ‘aborigine’, as 
evident in the Koperasi Kijang Mas and Sagong Tasi cases. For the latter case 
in particular, the Temuan Orang Asli who brought their case to court had their 
identity, within the meaning of Act 134, challenged.14 Secondly, as it is the def-
inition in Act 134 that gives meaning to the legal term ‘aborigine’, a change in 
legal definition of this class of persons may be effected without the safeguards 
and procedures given to the legal definition of ‘Malay’ and ‘native’ of Sabah 
and Sarawak, which are both defined in the Constitution (Rachagan 1990). 
When comparing the definitions of various indigenous groups in the 
Constitution (as supported by relevant statutes), therefore, it becomes apparent 
that they are based on different criteria. As stated, the definition of ‘aborigine’ 
relies on the Act 134 definition, which places importance on aboriginal prac-
tices (language, customs, beliefs and ‘way of life’), inclusion in an aboriginal 
community, and to some extent on ancestry.15 A ‘native’ of Sabah and Sarawak, 
13 This was a matter emphasized in the Sagong Tasi case.
14 Specifically, they were recognized as aboriginal Temuan people, but were challenged as to 
whether they still practised ‘Temuan culture’, as evidenced by their speaking an aboriginal lan-
guage, following ‘an aboriginal way of life’, and adhering to ‘aboriginal customs and beliefs’, 
which are requirements stipulated in the Act 134 definition. Qualifying for the Act 134 defini-
tion thus established the plaintiffs’ rights under statutory law. It is interesting to note that in the 
Koperasi Kijang Mas, Adong Kuwau and Sagong Tasi cases, administrative recognition of the 
plaintiffs by the Jabatan Hal-Ehwal Orang Asli (JHEOA) (evidenced by its prior dealings with 
them) was part of how their identity as Orang Asli was ‘proven’.
15 It also allows for individuals ‘of any race’ adopted by aborigines to be considered aborigine 
if they still practice an ‘aboriginal way of life’ and are accepted into an aboriginal community. 
Figure 1. Definitions of identity in the Malaysian legal system
Category Authority Definition
Aborigine 
(orang asli)
Federal Constitution, 
Article 160 (2)
‘an aborigine of the Malay Peninsula’
Aboriginal Peoples   
Act (1954, revised  
1974), Section 3
(1)+ In this Act an aborigine is – 
any person whose male parent is or was a mem-
ber of an aboriginal ethnic group, who speaks 
an aboriginal language and habitually follows 
an aboriginal way of life and aboriginal customs 
and beliefs, and includes a descendant through 
males of such persons; 
any person of any race adopted when an infant 
by aborigines who has been brought up as an 
aborigine, habitually speaks an aboriginal lan-
guage, habitually follows an aboriginal way of 
life and aboriginal customs and beliefs and is 
a member of an aboriginal community; or the 
child of any union between an aboriginal female 
and a male of another race, provided that the 
child habitually speaks an aboriginal language, 
habitually follows an aboriginal way of life and 
aboriginal customs and beliefs and remains a 
member of an aboriginal community.
(2) Any aborigine who by reason of conversion 
to any religion or for any other reason ceases to 
adhere to aboriginal beliefs but who continues to 
follow an aboriginal way of life and aboriginal 
customs or speaks an aboriginal language shall 
not be deemed to have ceased to be an aborigine 
by reason only of practising that religion.
(3) Any question whether any person is or is not 
an aborigine shall be decided by the Minister.
Malay 
(Orang 
Melayu)
Federal Constitution, 
Article 160
‘Malay’ means a person who professes the reli-
gion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay lan-
guage, conforms to Malay customs and –
was born before Merdeka Day in the Fede-a) 
ration or in Singapore or born of parents 
one of whom was born in the Federation 
or in Singapore, or is on that day domi-
ciled in the Federation or in Singapore; or 
is the issue of such a person;b) 
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Natives 
(bumiputra) 
of Sabah and 
Sarawak 
Federal Constitution, 
Article 161A (6) and (7)
(6) In this Article ‘native’ means – 
In relation to Sarawak, a person who is a) 
a citizen and either belongs to one of the 
races specified in Clause (7) as indigenous 
to the State or is of mixed blood deriving 
exclusively from those races, and
In relation to Sabah, a person who is a citi-b) 
zen, is the child or grandchild of a person 
of a race indigenous to Sabah, and was 
born (whether on or after Malaysia Day or 
not) either in Sabah or to a father domi-
ciled in Sabah at the time of the birth.
(7) The races to be treated for the purposes of the 
definition of ‘native’ in Clause (6) as indigenous 
to Sarawak are the Bukitans, Bisayahs, Dusuns, 
Sea Dayaks, Land Dayaks, Kadayans, Kalab-
its, Kayans, Kenyahs (including Sabups and 
Sipengs), Kajangs (including Sekapans, Keja-
mans, Lahanans, Punans, Tanjongs and Kanow-
its), Lugats, Lisums, Malays, Melanos, Muruts, 
Penans, Sians, Tagals, Tabuns and Ukits. 
Sources: Federal Constitution (as of 10 September 2002), Aboriginal Peoples Act (1954, revised 
1974)
on the other hand, is defined by ancestry or ‘race’, while the definition of 
‘Malay’ is based purely on socio-religious practice, and not ancestry or race 
(see also Mohd Salleh 1986). This has implications for the citizens of Malaysia 
in general and the Orang Asli in particular. It is possible that individuals can 
be legally reclassified as ‘Malay’ when they fulfil the three-pronged criteria 
of converting to Islam, taking on ‘Malay customs’, and demonstrating pro-
ficiency in the Malay language, a matter that already occurs on a social and 
political basis.16 As Tun Mohamed Suffian (1976:291) explains, ‘to be a Malay 
for the purposes of the Constitution you need not be of Malay ethnic origin. 
An Indian is Malay if he professes the Muslim religion, habitually speaks 
Malay and conforms to Malay custom’; the same applies for Chinese and other 
ethnic groups in Malaysia. In ‘becoming Malay’, these different ethnic groups 
‘become’ indigenous, and are legally qualified to receive bumiputra privi-
leges and ‘special rights’ as Malays. For Orang Asli, whose legal definition as 
‘aborigine’ is derived primarily from a demonstration that they still practise 
an aboriginal ‘way of life’, they stand to lose their legal identity as aborigines 
if they convert to Islam, speak Malay, and replace the practice of aboriginal 
customs with the practice of Malay customs. In contrast, no one can ‘become’ 
16 Nicholas 1996; Dentan et al. 1997; Dentan 1997.
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an ‘aborigine’ or ‘become’ a ‘native’ of Sabah and Sarawak by changing their 
socio-religious practices alone.17 
The ‘aborigines’ are mentioned three times in the Constitution (See 
Figure 2). Firstly, the ‘welfare of the aborigines’ is outlined as a ‘federal’ 
subject, and therefore a matter over which the federal government, rather 
than state govern ments, has responsibility.18 This means that the role of law 
making in relation to the Orang Asli lies in the hands of Parliament rather 
than the legislature of any state. Secondly, the constitutional monarch can 
appoint members to the Senate who ‘are capable of representing the inter-
ests of aborigines’.19 It is under this provision that the role of the Orang Asli 
Senator was created; significantly, it is an appointed rather than elected 
role.20 
Thirdly, the Constitution allows for special provisions applicable to all 
Orang Asli. According to common-law interpretations of Article 8(5)(c), 
these special provisions do not jeopardize the principle of equality before 
the law. This Article was discussed in two different significant court cases. 
In the Adong Kuwau High Court judgement, the presiding judge Mokhtar 
Sidin JCA interpreted Article 8(5)(c) to mean that ‘the aboriginal people of 
Malaysia [enjoy] a special position’. In the High Court ruling for Sagong Tasi 
([2002] 2 CLJ 543, pp. 555, 575), Judge Mohd Noor Ahmad J. noted that this 
Article, along with other constitutional and statutory provisions, supported 
the claim that both state and federal governments owe fiduciary duties to 
the Orang Asli, for which losses in consequence of the breach ‘must be made 
good’.21 
17 The social, political and legal permeability of Malay ethnicity creates unease among the 
Orang Asli, who are wary that ascription to Islam (with concomitant changes in lifestyle) po-
tentially results in a change of identity from ‘Orang Asli’ to ‘Malay’, a matter that is recognized 
and allowed for in the legal framework (see Nah 2004 for further discussion). It must be noted, 
however, that it is not as easy to ‘exit’ Malayness.
18 See Article 74 and 77, Item 16; List I – Federal List, Ninth Schedule. Significantly, it is impor-
tant to note that the ‘welfare of the aborigines’ under the aegis of the federal government does not 
extend to matters concerning land, over which state governments continue to hold authority. This 
creates legal difficulties for the Orang Asli in relation to land, a matter covered in greater depth 
below.
19 Article 45(2). In addition, he can appoint other representatives of racial minorities to the Sen-
ate, as well as individuals seen to have performed distinguished public, professional or social 
services. 
20 See Nah (2004) and Nicholas (2000) for further discussion.
21 At the time of writing, this is being contested at the Federal Court. 
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Figure 2. ‘Aborigines’ (‘orang asli’) in the Federal Constitution
Article 8 (1) All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal 
protection of the law.
(2) Except as expressly authorized by this Constitution, there shall 
be no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of reli-
gion, race, descent or place of birth in any law or in the appoint-
ment to any office or employment under a public authority or in 
the administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding 
or disposition of property or the establishing or carrying on of 
any trade, business, profession, vocation or employment. 
[….]
(5) This Article does not invalidate or prohibit – 
[….]
any provision for the protection, well-being or advancement a) 
of the aboriginal peoples of the Malay Peninsula (including 
the reservation of land) or the reservation to aborigines of 
a reasonable proportion of suitable positions in the public 
service […].
Article 45(2) The members to be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall 
be persons who in his opinion have rendered distinguished pub-
lic service or have achieved distinction in the professions, com-
merce, industry, agriculture, cultural activities or social service or 
are representatives of racial minorities or are capable of repre-
senting the interests of aborigines.
Article 74 and 77,
Item 16, List 
I – Federal List,           
Ninth Schedule. 
[Article 74(1)] Parliament may make laws with respect to any of 
the matters enumerated in the Federal List [List I][…]
[List I, at Item 16 reads] ‘Welfare of the Aborigines’
Note: Article 77 states that the Legislature of a State does not have the 
power to make laws on matters enumerated in the Ninth Schedule over 
which Parliament has the power to make laws.
Source: Federal Constitution as of 10 September 2002
Absences in the Constitution
Of great import are the ways in which ‘the aborigines’ are not mentioned, 
when ‘Malays’ and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak are. For example, there 
are restrictions on Parliament as to the making of laws that touch upon Is-
lamic law and Malay customs, as well as to native customs or laws in Sabah 
and Sarawak (Article 76, Article 150 (6A)), but not with regard to aboriginal 
customs. For the natives of Sabah and Sarawak specifically, the legislatures 
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of the state governments of Sabah and Sarawak are allowed to make laws 
with respect to native law and custom as well as to native procedure of native 
courts (see Article 74(20) and the Ninth Schedule, List IIA, Item 13), while the 
legislatures of states in the Peninsula, where all the Orang Asli are found, are 
not. This has allowed the natives of Sabah and Sarawak some recognition of 
rights to their customary lands that the Orang Asli did/do not enjoy.22
As detailed in Article 89(6), both ‘Malays’ and ‘natives’ are also given spe-
cial privileges with regard to Malay Reservations Land that the ‘aborigines’ 
are excluded from.23 Malay Reservations Land, unlike ‘aboriginal reserves’, 
‘aboriginal areas’, or ‘aboriginal inhabited places’ as legally recognized 
in Act 134, are specially protected in the Constitution. Specifically, Malay 
Reservations Land can only be degazetted by state enactments passed by 
a two-thirds majority vote in state legislative assemblies and a two-thirds 
majority vote approval by resolution of Parliament (Article 89(1)), which 
offers these lands stronger protection.24 
Symbolically, perhaps the most significant absence of the ‘aborigines’ in 
the Constitution, when compared to Malays and the natives of Sabah and 
Sarawak, is Article 153 of the Federal Constitution, which reads: 
It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the special 
position of the Malays and natives of any of the states of Sabah and Sarawak and 
the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions of 
this Article.
The aborigines are noticeably missing in this provision, an absence repeated 
in state-level constitutions which hold parallel articles. This is significant, 
for it is this constitutional provision that is the basis for justifying positive 
discrimination for the bumiputra, the most notable implementation being the 
New Economic Policy (NEP). This absence has created some ambiguity and 
debate over whether the Orang Asli are, in fact, bumiputra.25 
22 This does not mean that they enjoy security over their native lands (see King 1995). 
23 This was confirmed in Sagong Tasi case (Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & 
Ors ([2002] 2 CLJ 543, p. 576)), in which the judge specifically ruled that: ‘Article 89 when read as 
a whole does not include the aboriginal people of the Malay Peninsula because the word ‘natives’ 
appearing in sub-Article (6) is defined in Article 161A(6) to mean the natives of Sabah and Sara-
wak. If it is meant to be otherwise the word ‘aborigines’ would have been used in the sub-art.’ 
24 Not only are ‘aboriginal reserves’, ‘aboriginal areas’, or ‘aboriginal inhabited places’ not 
given constitutional recognition, Act 134 also stipulates that they may be gazetted and that the 
gazettement can be revoked by state authorities (without the involvement of Parliament). 
25 Further discussed in Nah 2004; Dentan et al. 1997; see also note 3.
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Other constitutional provisions: religion and property
Freedom of religion is guaranteed in Article 3(1) and Article 11 of the Consti-
tution for all non-Muslims, as is freedom of peaceful assembly in Article 10(1)
(b) and the right of individuals not to receive instruction or take part in any 
ceremony or act of worship other than his/her own (Article 12(3)).26 Orang 
Asli who have converted to Islam become subject to Islamic law, over which 
the legislatures of state governments have jurisdiction (Federal Constitution, 
Ninth Schedule, List II, Item 1), which is vested in Syariah courts.27 In addi-
tion to this, the Constitution allows for state and federal laws to be passed that 
control or restrict the propagation of non-Muslim religious doctrines among 
Muslims (Article 11(4)). Furthermore, each state has laws that empower state 
Islamic departments to regulate the activities of Muslims, a significant one 
being the observation of the fasting month, Ramadan.28
Last but not least, proprietary rights are protected under Article 13, of 
which sub-Article 1 reads: ‘No person shall be deprived of property save in 
accordance with law’ and sub-Article 2 reads: ‘No law shall provide for the 
compulsory acquisition or use of property without adequate compensation’. 
These have been interpreted in the Adong Kuwau and Sagong Tasi rulings to 
encompass the protection of native title (further discussed below).
Statutory rights: the Aboriginal Peoples Act (1954, revised 1974)
Aborigines are human beings with human reactions, and the idea of this [1953 
Abori ginal Peoples] Bill is to provide for their protection as human beings and 
not as museum pieces or exhibits. (Dato’ Onn bin Ja’afar, speech to the Legislative 
Council of the Federation of Malaya, 25 November 1953 (Report select committee 
1954)).
Also known as Act 134, the Aboriginal Peoples Act came into force in 1954, 
when British administrators were waging war against Communism in the 
Peninsula.29 The historical milieu within which this Act was created is of great 
significance to its content and to its contemporary impact on the Orang Asli. 
During the Emergency Period from 1948 to 1960, communist insurgents ad-
26 In relation to Article 12(3), parental/guardian consent must be obtained for those under 18 
years of age, as stated in Article 12(4).
27 Islamic law, when implemented judicially, is largely confined to matters of family law and 
land practices. However, there are socio-legal effects of Islamization that are often not considered 
by Orang Asli when they embrace Islam (see Endicott and Dentan 2004).
28 Because Orang Asli are often mistaken as Malays due to their similarities in physical appear-
ance, there have been many occasions where they were (almost) found in breach of the law by 
state Islamic departments for not fasting during Ramadan (Nah 2004).
29 Act 134 was later revised in 1967 and 1974. It is based on the Aboriginal Peoples Bill of 1953.
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opted guerrilla warfare tactics and established their bases in jungle areas in 
order to avoid detection. As the jungle was the province of the aborigines, the 
insurgents relied on aborigines in order to survive, and thus the loyalty of 
the aborigines was deemed crucial to the outcome of this confrontation. Mea-
sures were taken by British administrators to extend ‘protection’ to aboriginal 
groups while keeping them away from communist influence.30 When initial 
drafts of this Act (then known as the Aboriginal Peoples Ordinance) were first 
reviewed by the Select Committee of the Legislative Council on 27 January 
1954,31 its main principle and aims were outlined as follows:
to ensure that the aborigines were protected from unscrupulous exploitation, to 
safeguard their tribal organization and way of life from the too rapid advance of 
civilization and to remove any obstacles which might hinder their gradual ad-
vancement along the lines best suited to them in accordance with their changing 
environment.32
The introduction of the Ordinance in 1954 was a significant milestone in the 
administration of the Orang Asli, for this was the first time that the federal gov-
ernment officially declared its responsibility towards them (Jimin et al. 1983). 
In addition to giving meaning to the precise definition of ‘aborigine’ (see 
Figure 1), this Act gives extensive powers to the Department of Orang Asli 
Affairs (Jabatan Hal-Ehwal Orang Asli, JHEOA), a federal body established 
during the fight against Communism, that is currently responsible for the 
welfare of the Orang Asli. For example, the JHEOA has ultimate authority to 
decide whether a specific individual is deemed an ‘aborigine’ (Section 3(3)); 
it must approve all dealings in land by aborigines (Section 9); it can prevent 
any person or class of persons from entering aboriginal areas and reserves 
(Section 14); it may detain individuals in such areas which are deemed to 
be conducting activities detrimental to the welfare of aborigine(s) (Section 
15); and it appoints hereditary headmen of aboriginal communities to office 
(Section 16). The JHEOA is also given powers to impose regulations on a num-
ber of practices. These powers are related to land use, the entry of individuals 
as well as the circulation of information (in a variety of media) into aborigi-
nal spaces, the appointment of headmen, the registration of aborigines, the 
activities of aborigines within jungle areas, their education and employment, 
buying and selling of liquor, as well as the terminology by which aborigines 
are referred to (Section 19). 
30 Carey 1976; Holman 1958; Jimin et al. 1983; Leary 1989; Noone and Holman 1972; Miller 1972.
31 The content of the law was based on the Perak Aboriginal Enactment of 1939, largely crafted 
by anthropologist H.D. Noone, which was extended under British administration of the Federate d 
Malay States to Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang. 
32 Proceedings legislative council 1954:1. The Select Committee comprised Onn bin Ja’afar, Bukit 
Gantang, H. Zainal, Tengku Muhammad, Shamsudin B. Nain, A.H.P. Humphreys, Ismail Rah-
man, and H.M. Eusoff. Invited to the meeting was (then) Adviser on Aborigines, R.O.D. Noone, 
and the Assistant Legal Draftsman, A.M. Webb.
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Act 134 also reaffirms the role of state authorities in matters relating to 
land, giving them supreme powers to gazette and to revoke land as ‘aborigi-
nal reserve’ (Section 7), ‘aboriginal area’ (Section 6), or ‘aboriginal inhabited 
place’, which is in stark contrast to the multiple constitutional protections in 
place for Malay Reservations Land.33 State authorities may also order any 
aboriginal community to leave Malay Reservations Land (Section 10), and 
have powers to excise, alienate, grant, lease and otherwise dispose of land 
which aboriginal communities have used – with compensation being limited 
to fruit and rubber trees (Section 11).34 Section 12 further adds that state 
authorities may grant compensation for losses if land is excised from aborigi-
nal areas or reserves and may pay this to the Director General of the JHEOA 
to be held in a common fund.35 
Nevertheless, certain protections and ‘special rights’ are offered to Orang 
Asli under this Act. For example, they have the right to be present in lands 
gazetted as ‘aboriginal areas’ and ‘aboriginal reserves’, the right not to be 
excluded from schools, the right not to be obliged to attend any religious 
instruction without prior parental/guardian consent (Section 17), and the 
right not to be adopted by non-aboriginal parents except with the consent 
of the JHEOA (Section 18). Furthermore, the identification of the JHEOA 
(represented by the Commissioner) as being ‘responsible for the general 
administration, welfare and advancement of aborigines’ (Section 4), has been 
turned around to argue that the federal government owes a fiduciary duty to 
all Orang Asli. As argued in the Sagong Tasi case, this has become a matter 
enforceable through the judiciary. 
The interpretation of Act 134 in relation to the rights of Orang Asli has 
been an important consideration in court cases concerning Orang Asli land 
rights. Prior to these decisions, the application of Act 134 was bittersweet, for 
it was read and applied in ways that imposed many restrictions upon con-
temporary Orang Asli even while it codified some statutory rights for them. 
Certain sections of Act 134 eroded the autonomy of the Orang Asli and it was 
therefore rightly criticized as being irrelevant, paternalistic and restrictive. 
Civil society actors repeatedly called for its review if not its outright repeal. 
However, the application and significance of Act 134 has been re-evaluated 
and redefined through judicial decisions. 
33 However, Section 7(2i) also states that once land has been declared an ‘aboriginal reserve’, no 
land within it can be declared Malay reservations land.
34 In Adong Kuwau & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor ([1997] 1 MLJ 418, p. 431), the 
presiding High Court judge interpreted that: ‘By virtue of [section] 10 [of Act 134], the rights of 
the aboriginal peoples to occupy and/or collect forest produce overrides Malay reserve land, for-
est reserve or game reserve. Section 10 reflects the legislature’s intention to allow the aboriginal 
people to lead the type of life they have always led, which has been nomadic and always looking 
for greener pastures’. 
35 Section 12 was later reinterpreted to bring it in line with protections offered by the Federal 
Constitution in the Sagong Tasi Court of Appeal judgement, discussed below.
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In the Adong Kuwau High Court ruling, the judge emphasized that Act 
134 does not revoke the rights of the Orang Asli at common law, a matter 
reinforced by the Court of Appeal and then followed in the Sagong Tasi case. 
The Court of Appeal judgement for Sagong Tasi further expanded on the 
application of Act 134, emphasizing that it be read in a purposive manner. 
The judgement affirmed that the interpretation of Act 134 should not ‘curtail 
or restrict aboriginal land rights’, which would ‘run counter to the purpose of 
[this Act]’.36 Gopal Sri Ram, writing the judgement, expressed:
the purpose of the 1954 Act [the Aboriginal Peoples Act] was to protect and uplift the 
First Peoples of this country. It is therefore fundamentally a human rights statute. It 
acquires a quasi constitutional status giving it pre-eminence over ordinary legisla-
tion. It must therefore receive a broad and liberal interpretation […] There is there-
fore no doubt in my mind that the 1954 Act calls for a construction liberally in favour 
of the aborigines as enhancing their rights rather than curtailing them […].37 
The ‘aborigines’ are also mentioned in other statutes, which give them special 
rights and privileges. The Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act of 1976 
(also known as Act 164), for example, allows for the marriage and divorce of 
‘aborigines’ to be governed by native customary law or aboriginal customs, if 
that is their choice. Furthermore, in the Protection of Wildlife Act of 1972, an 
aborigine is allowed to shoot, kill, or take protected wild animals and birds 
‘for the purpose of providing food for himself or his family’, when other Ma-
laysians are not given such freedoms (Section 52). Thirdly, as stated in the 
National Forestry Act 1984 (Act 313), aborigines can all be exempted from 
holding licenses for the removal of forest produce from certain classes of land 
(Section 40(3)). Lastly, a certain type of aborigine (‘nomadic aborigines’) is 
mentioned in the Employee Provident Fund Act of 1991, which stipulates that 
they are, by default, not considered ‘employees’, unless the Director-General 
of the JHEOA recommends otherwise. 
Common law developments: native title, usufructuary rights and proprietary rights
As has been stated, several important cases have come through the courts 
in the past two decades, which have established land rights for Orang Asli 
through common law (see also Hooker 2001; Nicholas 2003). These devel-
opments have created exceptions to current systems of administering land, 
which is governed by the National Land Code of 1965, based on the Austra-
lian Torrens system of registration. According to the Code, all un-alienated 
land is considered ‘Sultanate Land’ under the management of state authori-
36 Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors [2002] 2 CLJ 543, p. 24.
37 Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors [2002] 2 CLJ 543, pp. 19-20.
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ties. Furthermore, the Land Acquisition Act of 1960 allows state authorities 
wide freedom to acquire lands already alienated, but specifies that compensa-
tion must to be given for the value of the lands acquired. In this section of the 
paper, I discuss the protection of Orang Asli customary land rights through 
case law developments, looking at the Adong Kuwau and Sagong Tasi cases 
in greater detail after brief consideration of the Koperasi Kijang Mas case.
Exclusive rights to commercial activities in aboriginal places: Koperasi Kijang Mas 
Bhd & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Perak & Ors (1991)
The plaintiffs sought declaration that the land in question, Kuala Betis, was an 
‘aboriginal area’ and not just ‘state land’. Therefore, they claimed, only ‘aborigi-
nes’ had rights over forest produce from that area. They argued that the actions 
of one of the defendants, the Director of Forestry (a federal agency), to offer the 
land to a private limited company (another defendant) was unlawful because 
the latter had no connection with the aborigines. The plaintiffs argued that this 
company had therefore no right to conduct logging activities in the area. 
The presiding judge, Abdul Malek Ahmad H, made these declarations and 
ruled that only aborigines, as specified under Act 134, had rights to harvest 
forest produce from these areas. He agreed that ‘logging conducted by any 
body, organization, foundation or representative and their agents that are not 
owned by aborigines are in violation of s. 6(2iv) of the Aboriginal People’s Act 
1954’ (p. 651).38 In this court case, Orang Asli were able to claim special rights 
and privileges by virtue of their legal identity.
Introducing native title: the Adong Kuwau case
In this case, 52 plaintiffs of the Jakun tribe living in Linggiu Valley were dis-
placed from their traditional and ancestral land upon which they foraged. 
This occurred when the land was alienated by the Johor state government 
and the Johor Director of Land and Mines for the building of a dam in agree-
ment with the government of Singapore. The plaintiffs claimed that the com-
pensation they received as recommended by the JHEOA (in accordance with 
Sections 11 and 12 of Act 134) was inadequate. New judicial concepts were 
introduced in this landmark case, in particular, that of native title.
The judge laid down his understanding of native title, drawing upon prece-
38 Article 6(2iv) states that ‘no licences for the collection of forest produce under any written law 
relating to forests shall be issued to persons not being aborigines normally resident in that aborigi-
nal area or to any commercial undertaking without consulting the Commissioner and in granting 
any such licence it may be ordered that a specified proportion of aboriginal labour be employed’.
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dents in the United States, Canada and Australia, stating that ‘it is the right of 
the native to continue to live on their land as their forefathers had done’, a right 
‘acquired in law’ and not based on any document or title.39 This also meant that 
‘future generations of the aboriginal people would be entitled to this right of 
their forefathers’.40 Specifically, he defined this ‘right over the land’ to include:
the right to move freely about their land, without any form of disturbance or inter-
ference and also to live from the produce of the land itself, but not to the land itself 
in the modern sense that the aborigines can convey, lease out, rent out the land or 
any produce therein since they have been in continuous and unbroken occupation 
and/or enjoyment of the rights of the land from time immemorial.41 
He ruled that compensation had to be given not just for rubber and fruit trees, 
as required in Act 134,42 but ‘for what is above the land over which the plain-
tiffs have a right’, that is compensation ‘for the loss of livelihood and hunt-
ing ground’.43 These, he established, were protected under Article 13 of the 
Federa l Constitution (concerned with proprietary rights to land), and could 
not be exclude d by Act 134. Compensation was thus given for five types of 
deprivation: of heritage land, of freedom of inhabitation or movement, of 
produce of the forest, of future living for the plaintiffs and their immediate 
families, and of future living for their living descendants. Compensation was 
valued at RM 26.5 million for 53,273 acres of land. When this was reviewed in 
the Court of Appeal, the presiding judges upheld the decision, and reaffirmed 
that ‘deprivation of livelihood may amount to deprivation of life itself and that 
state action which produced such a consequence may be impugned on well-
established grounds’.44 This judgement was affirmed by the Federal Court.
Proprietary rights in and to the land: the Sagong Tasi case
Eight months before the Adong Kuwau High Court judgement, a portion of 
land upon which several Temuan families lived was acquired for construction 
of a portion of a highway that joined the Kuala Lumpur International Airport 
to the North-South Highway. These families were evicted, with only minimal 
compensation given for their loss of fruit trees, crops and homes – not for the 
value of the land upon which they resided. They brought the Selangor state 
government, the federal government, the highway authority, and the private 
39 Adong Kuwau & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418, p. 428.
40 Adong Kuwau & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418, p. 430.
41 Adong Kuwau & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418, p. 430.
42 The JHEOA recommended a compensation of RM 560,535 (Adong Kuwau & Ors v. Kerajaan 
Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418, p. 425).
43 Adong Kuwau & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418, p. 431.
44 Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor v. Adong Kuwau & Ors [1998] 2 CLJ 665, p. 158.
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construction company to court, and argued for the recognition of native title 
with attendant full compensation. Part of the land in question had already 
been gazetted as aboriginal land under the Aborigines Peoples Act of 1954 
while another part of it remained ungazetted. 
The presiding judge, Mohd Noor Ahmad J, affirmed that the plaintiffs 
held native title to the gazetted land as was recognized in the Adong Kuwau 
High Court judgement, which included usufructuary rights (that is, the right 
to the possession and enjoyment of the land), as well as interest in and to the 
land. These rights, he decided, were proprietary rights under common law 
which were protected in Article 13 of the Federal Constitution.45 Specifically, 
the Judge ruled:
Apart from the Orang Asli and the native people of the Borneo states, there are no 
other classes of people in Malaysia who occupy the said lands on the basis of cus-
tomary right except the lands occupied under the tribal adapt in Negeri Sembilan 
and Malacca […] Thus, the Act speaks of aboriginal reserve land and aboriginal 
occupied land. The latter refers to hereditary land or customary land.46 
Therefore, he ruled that when native title – a title held at common law – was 
revoked, it warranted the same compensation awarded to other title holders 
under the Torrens system, as specified by the Land Acquisition Act of 1960. 
This judgement was subsequently upheld and extended by the Court 
of Appeal. Several important points were made in this written judgement. 
Firstly, as discussed earlier, the judges ruled that the Aboriginal Peoples Act 
be read in a purposive manner, as a human rights statute. Secondly, the judge-
ment dealt with the interpretation of Section 12 of the Aboriginal Peoples Act, 
modifying it in order to bring it in accord with the Federal Constitution. 
Specifically, the judges added two words, rephrasing it to say, ‘the State 
Authority “shall” grant “adequate” compensation therefore’.47 In doing so, 
they confirmed that Section 12 does not merely confer discretion on the state 
authority to decide whether compensation should be paid, it becomes the 
duty of the state authority to ensure that compensation is made. 
Thirdly, and significantly, the Orang Asli were also deemed to be in pos-
session of customary community title for the lands that had not yet been 
gazetted.48 The judges ruled that the failure or neglect of the Selangor state 
government, the first defendant, to gazette the area they inhabited was a 
breach of fiduciary duty, for the state had not fulfilled its commitment to 
45 He further noted, following Mabo v. Queensland ([1991-1992] 175 CRL1), that although na-
tive title was a community title, ‘individuals within the community could by its laws and customs 
possess proprietary individual rights over the respective parcels of land’ (Sagong Tasi & Ors v. 
Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors [2002] 2 CLJ 543, p. 568).
46 Adong Kuwau & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418, p. 573.
47 Aboriginal Peoples Act of 1954, p. 31.
48 At the time of writing, this is being challenged at the Federal Court.
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protect the rights of Orang Asli in relation to their lands. Applied properly, 
this has resounding implications for the current status of Orang Asli custom-
ary lands, many of which have not yet been gazetted despite numerous and 
repeated appeals by Orang Asli communities for this to be done (Williams-
Hunt 1995). This judgement reinforces that state authorities are held respon-
sible for protecting the land rights of the Orang Asli. 
While these developments in case law bode well for the Orang Asli, the 
wide powers of the Land Acquisition Act of 1960 still permit government 
authorities to acquire Orang Asli customary land. As Anthony Williams-Hunt, 
an Orang Asli spokesperson, commented about the judgement in Sagong Tasi 
& Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors ([2002] 2 CLJ 543), ‘We cannot stop 
people from taking the land. We may get some compensation, but as long as 
the government says that it is for development, you have no say. There must 
be some protection for this.’49 As Wui Ling Cheah (2004) also notes, this land-
mark decision does not take into account the spiritual, religious, cultural and 
communal dimensions of Orang Asli customary lands; it merely treats the 
land as a possession or commodity to be compensated at monetary value.
Going to court: everyday realities
In discussing this case with me, the leading lawyer for the plaintiffs in the 
Adong Kuwau case, S. Kanawagi, said that they faced many challenges. As 
the aboriginal communities for which they advocated were not able to bear 
the costs of such litigation, expenses for the first case, which took more than 
six years to fight, were borne by the lawyers.50 As the case was proceeding, 
the plaintiffs were pressured to drop their claims in various ways outside of 
court, although the ‘messengers’ of such ‘suggestions’ often came incognito. 
The lawyers for the plaintiffs did not desire that this case receive great 
publicity. When the judgement was first released, it was without much media 
attention. Furthermore, as the legal system was based on colonial concep-
tions of land, property, and ownership, arguments for native title required 
a rethinking of fundamental principles of justice. In this case it wasn’t just 
that ‘the Orang Asli are totally innocent, they don’t know their rights’, as 
Kanawagi said, but that the judges who presided in the cases, too, had to 
reassess the fundamental structures and premises of the postcolonial legal 
system in order to decide the rights of the Orang Asli.51
49 Interview with ‘Bah Toni’, Anthony Williams-Hunt, ex-president of the Peninsular Malaysia 
Orang Asli Association, Ipoh, 3-12-2002.
50 Interview with S. Kanawagi, lawyer for plaintiffs in Adong Kuwau & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri 
Johor & Anor ([1997] 1 MLJ 418), Kuala Lumpur, 29-12-2002.
51 In July 2004, the Orang Asli involved in this case made it known that the compensation they 
had been awarded had not been disbursed appropriately, and lodged a police report against their 
lawyer, S. Kanawagi. Investigations are ongoing.
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For the plaintiffs in the Sagong Tasi case, the process of going to court was, 
as Ilam Senin noted, frightening and stressful for the Bukit Tampoi Temuans. 
As he said, ‘We encouraged them to be brave, to stand up for their rights 
as indigenous people. That gave them courage.’52 One of the lawyers for the 
plaintiffs, Rashid Ismail, noted that the legal process was quite unfamiliar to 
the Temuan people involved. He commented, ‘[The plaintiffs] were excep-
tionally afraid of going to court; the environment was totally alien to them, 
they had not been exposed to that before.’53 This, along with language difficul-
ties, made it difficult for them to extract ‘evidence’ from their own witnesses, 
which the lawyers needed to build their case. ‘What we considered relevant, 
they did not think was relevant […] [They were also] not comfortable with 
Bahasa [Malay language];54 they had limited vocabulary, which impeded them 
from fully expressing themselves.’ Commenting on this matter, Sharmila 
Sekaran, also a lawyer for the plaintiffs, noted,55 
When we asked them ‘What are your customs?’, they replied, ‘Yes, we have our 
customs.’ In law, we are not supposed to lead our witnesses. But they could not 
see the intent of what the lawyers were trying to do […] They don’t know what is 
relevant and what is not.’ 
This, she suggested, was not unrelated to the very specific format of discourse 
required in the courts, which was very different from what the Temuan wit-
nesses were accustomed to. ‘For the Orang Asli, their understanding is that 
you discuss problems. But in court, you need ‘yes [or] no’ answers. They don’t 
know what to say [to our questions], what is relevant.’ 
She continued to elaborate on the everyday difficulties of bringing the case 
to court: 
First, we had to have their trust; this made it easier to deal with them. Because they 
have a lack of understanding about the legal system, they didn’t trust the system. 
[If they don’t trust us] they can withhold information or evidence that is crucial to 
the case. Second, we have trouble with language. Most important information was 
from the older people, who don’t speak Bahasa. During the question and answer 
sessions, the translator sometimes just gave a summary, or the translation is not in 
full. Thirdly, we needed help with logistics […] [the plaintiffs] had to attend every 
day of the trial. Some of them go to work in towns because they can’t work on the 
land [any longer], and they couldn’t get leave.56
52 Interview with Ilam Senin, Orang Asli involved in the Sagong Tasi case, Gombak, 15-12-2002.
53 Interview with Rashid Ismail, lawyer for plaintiffs in the Sagong Tasi case, Kuala Lumpur, 
16-8-2002.
54 Malay language is the official language used in courts.
55 Interview with Sharmila Sekaran, lawyer for plaintiffs in the Sagong Tasi case, Petaling Jaya, 
14-9-2002. 
56 Similar observations were held by another lawyer who has provided legal advice to Orang 
Asli individuals on various issues, including land compensation. As he stated, ‘The Orang Asli 
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The judge’s role in addressing some of these communication issues was im-
portant, as Ms Sekaran explained. In this particular case, the judge insisted 
that the interpreters explain the proceedings to the plaintiffs, and ensured 
that they knew what was going on. ‘This shows a consideration of them as 
people, upholding their dignity,’ she said, which gave the plaintiffs greater 
confidence during the whole procedure. Going to court was also a legal pro-
cess not divorced from social and political realities. As Colin Nicholas, who 
was involved throughout the court case (and who observed the reactions and 
responses of witnesses at the trial), noted, certain individuals were hesitant 
in providing evidence for the plaintiffs, as they were government servants 
and felt that they couldn’t say anything ‘against’ the government, who were 
among the defendants in the proceedings.57 
Bringing such a case to court was a learning experience for the lawyers 
involved, most of whom did not have much prior contact with Orang Asli 
groups. It was also a new experience for the Orang Asli plaintiffs. The court 
proceedings introduced new means by which defence against dispossession 
can be articulated and have given Orang Asli greater confidence in the rights 
that they can enjoy in the Malaysian nation-state. Following the Sagong Tasi 
High Court judgement, two communities in Sabah and Sarawak brought two 
companies to court for encroaching on their customary land (International 
Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 2003).
Conclusion
The Malaysian legal system does allow some room for the practice of what 
Levy (2000) terms ‘indigenous law’, albeit in different ways for different cate-
gories of citizens. Customary inclusions were given to Malays and to the 
natives of Sabah and Sarawak under the Constitution. For Malays, the legal 
system recognizes and allows for certain Islamic customs and laws to be in-
corporated and independently decided upon in Syariah courts. State legisla-
tive assemblies are also able to rule on matters involving Islam. In Sabah and 
are sometimes not able to take up the legal advice [I offer them]. They are fearful; fearful of chal-
lenging the authorities; fearful because they are not familiar with the legal system. I have advised 
them that it is not ‘anti-government’ [to file a case] but it is asserting their rights. The people who 
take cases to court are the ones who are more articulate, confident, aware, and have better net-
working. They are familiar with the systems of the outside world. [Most Orang Asli] are fearful 
that they won’t have the financial resources; fearful that they have to pay the costs for the other 
side [if they lose the case]. They have no confidence that they will win.’ Speaking in particular 
about compensation for land taken by the government, he says, ‘They think “it is better to have 
a bird in hand than two in a bush”, and they are happy with compensation for fruit trees. Most 
people are not happy, but they will accept rather than fight for their rights. Education is needed 
to overcome this’ (Interview with a lawyer, Klang Valley, 10-10-2002).
57 Seminar presented at the National University of Singapore, October 2002.
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Sarawak, native customs and laws are recognized and allowed judicial recog-
nition in native courts. The Orang Asli, however, have no such decentralized 
systems. With the exception of land matters, which are legislated (with some 
restriction) by state legislative assemblies, all laws in relation to them are 
made by Parliament and all legal cases concerning their customary practices 
come through the regular subordinate and superior courts. The only ways in 
which they have enjoyed any recognition of their customary practices have 
been through common law developments. 
Most Orang Asli are neither aware of their rights in the written text of the 
law, nor are they familiar with the process of seeking justice through judi-
cial systems. As such, they rely on interpreters of the law – JHEOA officials, 
civil society actors, lawyers, and judges – to help them with the everyday 
struggles they face. Most do not possess the confidence, money, time, special-
ized knowledge, and linguistic skills to bring to the cases to court. They are 
vulnerable to cheating and poor advice. The juridical field is structured in a 
way that is strange to the Orang Asli plaintiffs (as it is to many other citizens 
of Malaysia); it is a formal terrain in which they feel uncomfortable and in 
which they require the help of authorities who possess the types of capital 
needed to argue for their rights (Bourdieu 1987). 
For every successful case for land rights won through the courts, there 
have been many more incidents of Orang Asli communities whose rights to 
land have not been given recognition through case law. Despite the existence 
of legal and administrative provisions to gazette Orang Asli lands in order 
to protect them, these are under-utilized. Lands approved for gazetting as 
Orang Asli reserves as far back as the 1960s have not actually been gazetted 
(Nicholas 2007). Drawing on official data provided by the JHEOA, Nicholas 
points out that in 2003, only 15.1% of the total land area recognized as Orang 
Asli inhabited places, areas, or reserves were actually gazetted. Of greater 
concern, he notes, is the fact that the area of gazetted reserves has actually 
been decreasing over the years. Between 1990 and 2003, 1,444 hectares were 
de-gazetted while approval for gazetting 7,315 hectares was revoked without 
the land ever being given this formal status.
The expansion of plantations, extraction of timber, and appropriation 
of land for factories, highways, and development projects still results in 
encroachment on Orang Asli customary lands. By virtue of their identity as 
minority indigenous people, they have been able to argue for recognition of 
native title and to appropriate compensation at market rates. However, the 
legal concept of native title has only just been established – up to now it has 
limited bearing on the actual lives of Orang Asli, who continue to be dis-
placed and dispossessed.
Alice M. Nah234
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